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British Policy in China and Russo-Japanese
Rivalry in the Far East
Roman Kodet
By the end of the 19th century Great Britain had to deal with new serious problems in
the Far East. The position of its international rivals – especially Russia – rose consid-
erably during the 90s. This was quite apparent in the northern part of Qing Empire –
Manchuria where the Russians gained important concessions and a naval base of Port
Arthur. Britain therefore tried to utilize the deepening of the Russo-Japanese rivalry,
which was apparent since the second half of the 19th century. After new Russian pres-
sure ensuing the Boxer revolution, London started direct negotiations with Tokyo. Their
result was the signing of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which ended the era of British
“Splendid Isolation”. Thanks to this development and naval and economic cooperation
of both countries, Japan was able to soundly defeat Russia in the Russo-Japanese war.
This was a considerable success of the British diplomacy, which was able to stop its
main opponent without going to war itself. On the other hand, the rise of Japan as a
Great Power meant, that the Land of the Rising Sun became a key factor in the British
position in China. Britain started to be increasingly dependent on its support in next
years.
[Great Britain; China; Japan; Russia; diplomacy; international relations; Russo-Japanese
War; Anglo-Japanese Alliance]
China’s defeat1 in the war with Japan (1894–1895) and the subsequent
fight for concessions between the Great Powers and China’s response
in the form of the anti-foreigner movement culminating in the Boxer
Rebellion of 1899–1900 led to a marked change in the balance of power
in China, which began to be called “the Sick Man of the Far East” by
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West Bohemia, Sedlácˇkova 31, 306 14 Plzenˇ, Czech Republic.
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1 This text is one of the results of the grant “Political and Economic Interests of Great
Britain and Germany in China in 1894–1914” awarded by the Grant Agency of the
Czech Republic (GA13-12431S).
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certain observers.2 The international resolution to the Boxer Rebellion
definitively demonstrated that Chinese issues were no longer under
the sole control of Great Britain as they had been for most of the 19th
century. The weakening of China as a result of external pressure and
the erosion of the central government’s power had led to the grad-
ual erosion of British influence and prestige throughout the region.
The main catalyser of change in the Far East was the Sino-Japanese
War, which transformed the balance of power in Asia in a fundamen-
tal way.3 In subsequent years, a large number of Great Powers forced
new concessions which represented the foundations for their influ-
ence in China. Between 1895 and 1902 alone, Germany, Japan, Russia,
Italy and also representatives of the Habsburg monarchy and Belgium
acquired concessions in Tianjin. Germany (Jiaozhou),4 Russia (Dalian
and Port Arthur) and France (Guangzhouwan) then acquired major
leased territories which significantly helped them to promote their in-
terests in theMiddle Kingdom and create their own spheres of interest
which were meant to secure them trade penetration of the crumbling
Qing Empire. As such, Britain’s concept of free penetration of China,
which reached a peak in the period after the Second Opium War,5 es-
sentially collapsed despite the fact that Britain still retained its clear
dominance of Chinese trade.6
As such, London had to pay a lot more attention to the Chinese is-
sue following the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion than it had done
in the prior period. In the years following the signing of the Boxer Pro-
tocol, Britain (as the country with the most significant economic inter-
ests in China) and the other Great Powers had to deal with a number
of fundamental issues of Chinese policy. From London’s perspective,
2 D. SCOTT, China and the International System, 1840–1949, New York 2008, p. 152.
3 S. C.M. PAINE, The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, Cambridge 2003, p. 370.
4 T.G. OTTE, “Great Britain, Germany, and the Far-Eastern Crisis of 1897–8”, in: The
English Historical Review, 110, 439, 1995, pp. 1157–1159. Britain responded to the Ger-
man presence in Jiaozhou and the Russian presence in Port Arthur by leasing the
Weihaiwei base. Modern historians have come to the conclusion that this step was
motivated by an intention to neutralise Germany’s entry into China rather than an
attempt to balance Russia’s position. Ibidem, p. 1177.
5 J. K. FAIRBANK, Deˇjiny Cˇíny, Praha 1998, p. 237.
6 The National Archives, London, Kew (further only TNA), Foreign Office (further
only FO) 405/171, General Report on China for the year 1906, p. 21, Jordan to Grey,
Peking, 1. 6. 1907.
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two issues were particularly important: the policy of the other powers
in China, and internal developments in the Middle Kingdom, which
had to deal with the failure of its previous policies. Looking at the first
issue, a primary problem for Britain was Russia’s sudden penetration
of northern China which threatened Britain’s overall position in the
region. In terms of China’s internal affairs, the issue of reform of the
formerly powerful empire and the problems related to this – loans,
concessions and foreign trade – played a key role. Great Britain thus
had to carefully monitor all aspects of Far East Policy more than ever
before in order to be able to continue to control the course of events
there and maintain its interests and position within China.
Rivalry of the Great Powers in Northern China and the Establish-
ment of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance
As has already been noted, it was the entry of the other Great Pow-
ers onto the Chinese stage which represented a fundamental problem
for Britain’s policy in the Far East from the 1880s. London may have
seen the main threat in Russia’s penetration of northern China.7 The
failure of Chinese reforms then made the Middle Kingdom a stage
for a new struggle between the Great Powers to expand their inter-
ests and spheres of influence. A fairly young power (of only regional
importance at this time) in the form of Japan’s regime of Meiji pe-
riod reformers, however, got involved in this conflict, and its dynamic
entry into Chinese politics and its protectorate, Korea, had a funda-
mental impact on the development of the situation here in the form
of Japanese–Russian rivalry,8 whose roots can be traced back to the
end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th century, when the Russians
expressed marked interest in the islands of Hokkaido, Sakhalin and
the Kuril Islands claimed by Japan.9 Russia had even governed the is-
land of Tsushima in the Korea Strait for a short time in 1861, before
they were forced out following emphatic British protests.10 In 1875,
7 A. MALOZEMOFF, Russian Far Eastern Policy 1881–1904, Berkeley – Los Angeles
1958, p. 36.
8 PAINE, pp. 94–95.
9 M.B. JANSEN, The Making of Modern Japan, Cambridge – London 2000, pp. 258–264;
for more on the beginning of Russia’s penetration of Japan and the Far East, see
G.A. LENSEN, The Russian Push Towards Japan. Russo-Japanese Relations, 1697–1875,
Princeton 1989.
10 M.R. AUSLIN, Negotiating with Imperialism. The Unequal Treaties and the Culture of
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St Petersburg forced the government in Tokyo to sign a treaty which
secured Russia control of Sakhalin.11 Further Russian claims subse-
quently persuaded Japan that satisfying Russian demands only led
to further demands. As such, Tokyo, at the time mainly dealing with
internal reforms, endeavoured to find a way to secure itself against
possible Russian aggression.
One of the ways for the leaders of the recent Meiji Revolution rep-
resented by the slogan “fukoku kyohei” (enrich the state, strengthen
the military) to achieve their goals was for Japan to expand its terri-
tory along the model of the Western Powers. In this regard, Tokyo was
quick to imitate the form of their expansion, as demonstrated dur-
ing the expedition to Formosa in 1874, and in particular two years
later when Japan used the threat of warfare to force Korea to open up
through signature of the Gangwa Treaty.12 Japan’s penetration of the
peninsula, however, led to strong rivalry between Japan and China,
which the European powers also got involved in (mainly Russia and
Great Britain,13 culminating in 1894 in the outbreak of a war between
the two countries in which China was heavily defeated to the surprise
of the European public (though not to the diplomats present there).
As such, the Middle Kingdom found itself on the edge of calamity.14
The outcome was the signature of the Treaty of Shimonoseki (17 April
1895) which awarded Formosa, the Pescadores islands, the Liaodong
Peninsula and 200 million taels (25 million pounds) in war reparations
to Japan.15 These profits, however, were in direct conflict with Russian
ambitions in the Far East, which aimed to acquire an ice-free port in
Japanese Diplomacy, Harvard 2006, pp. 80ff.
11 LENSEN, p. 458; details also in J. L. McCLAIN, A Modern History of Japan, New York
– London 2002, p. 288.
12 P. DUUS, The Abacus and the Sword. The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895–1910, Berke-
ley – Los Angeles – London 1995, pp. 46–48; J. KOCˇVAR, “The Opening of Korea
until 1876”, in: Prague Papers on the History of International Relations, 2009, pp. 209ff;
H. CONROY, The Japanese Seizure of Korea – 1868–1910, Philadelphia 1960, pp. 65–66.
13 For more on British policy in Korea before the Sino-Japanese War, see A. SKRˇIVAN
st. – A. SKRˇIVAN ml., “Velká Británie a ‘hra o Koreu’. K vývoji na Dálném východeˇ
prˇed první cˇínsko-japonskou válkou”, in: Historický obzor, 25, 9/10, 2014, pp. 207–
215.
14 At the end of the war, even its capital city was at the mercy of Japan’s weapons.
D. TWITCHETT – J. K. FAIRBANK (eds.), The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 11,
London – New York – New Rochelle 1980, p. 273.
15 PAINE, pp. 271ff.
246
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
R. Kodet, British Policy in China and Russo-Japanese Rivalry in the Far East
the form of the Port Arthur base on the southern tip of the Liaodong
Peninsula. As such, with the support of France and Germany, Rus-
sia placed itself at the head of the so-called Triple Intervention which
forced Tokyo to give up Liaodong and the Pescadores Islands in ex-
change for a further 30 million taels in war reparations.16 Just two
years later, a Russian fleet overwintered in Port Arthur, and St Peters-
burg forced Beijing to sign a treaty leasing the port to the Russians.17
The subsequent Sino-Russian agreement on construction of a railway
line from the port to the then built Trans-Siberian Railway,18 clearly
testifies to the importance Russia gave this region, and the level of its
engagement in the Far East.
Britain was, of course, aware of the serious threat Russia’s penetra-
tion represented to its interests.19 London anticipated that approval of
the construction of the Russian railway in Manchuria was just another
of Russian Finance Minister Sergei Yulyevich Witte’s steps to acquire
a dominant position not just in Manchuria, but the whole of north-
ern China.20 This fact naturally brought it closer to Japan, for whom
Russian expansion also represented a serious threat and which could
not forget the humiliation it had experienced during the Triple Inter-
vention which had deprived it of its sweetest fruits of victory. Even
before the conflict and during the war, a number of Britain’s repre-
sentatives in the Far East had expressed fairly open sympathy with
Japan.21 The victory of the Land of the Rising Sun was subsequently
considered by some observers as proof of Japan’s entry to the club
of “civilised” countries, something also evidenced in an article by the
News Chronicle newspaper correspondent, Sir Henry Norman, who
16 Ibidem, p. 289; cf. D. KEENE, Emperor of Japan. Meiji and His World, 1852–1912, New
York 2002, pp. 506–508; A. SKRˇIVAN st. – A. SKRˇIVAN ml., “Soumrak rˇíše Cˇchingu˚.
Cˇínsko-japonská válka, 1894–1895”, in: Historický obzor, 25, 11/12, 2014, pp. 255ff.
17 T. G. OTTE, The China Question. Great Power Rivalry and British Isolation, 1894–1905,
New York 2007, p. 139. It is interesting that a number of Russian naval commanders
did not consider Port Arthur an ideal base because of geographical conditions and
doubted that it would meet naval needs. MALOZEMOFF, p. 100.
18 MALOZEMOFF, p. 112.
19 TNA, PRO 30/33/16/1, Ernest Mason Satow diary, 4. 5. 1896.
20 A.L. ROSENBAUM, “The Manchuria Bridgehead: Anglo-Russian Rivalry and the
Imperial Railways of North China”, in:Modern Asian Studies, 10, 1, 1976, p. 44.
21 I. NISH, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894–1907,
London – New York 2012, pp. 11–14.
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wrote that, “the war with China [. . . ] will at last force foreigners to see
Japan as she is. The Japanese are a martial and proud race, with marvellous
intelligence, and untiring energy and enthusiasm”.22 Following the Triple
Intervention, Britain assured Tokyo that Britain did not approve of this
development and it never planned to deprive Japan of the “reasonable
fruits of her victories, although they would have much preferred no distur-
bance of the status quo”.23 Britain’s favourable position towards Japan,
however, did not automatically signal possible collaboration between
the two countries, although it did herald a change in London’s ap-
proach to the country which until recently had been perceived as an
“uncivilised” state at the level of China. Britain, whose policy during
the conflict was focused on ensuring its status in China and Japan was
not damaged (which was quite difficult), as such hoped that their non-
participation in the Triple Intervention would allow for future collab-
oration with the island empire.24
Russian strategy in the second half of the 1890s, however, aroused
ever greater fears in Britain regarding St Petersburg’s intentions. The
greatest worries were induced by the fact that Russia had, through a
combination of promises and pressure, been able to exploit the Chi-
nese government’s weaknesses and the fact that at that time China
“was not a centralized state like France but a group of loosely federated
satrapies”, which gave the Russia the opportunity to govern China’s
outlying territories, over which the imperial court had mere formal
control.25 This reality expressed itself above all following the outbreak
of the Boxer Rebellion, which also affected Russia’s sphere of interests
in Manchuria,26 and on the pretext of maintaining order it allowed
Russia to more than double its military presence in the region. At the
end of November 1900, St Petersburg was able to sign a treaty with
Beijing in which it was able to keep its forces in Manchuria for as
long as it considered necessary.27 This development convinced many
22 PAINE, p. 17.
23 OTTE, The China Question, p. 70.
24 SKRˇIVAN – SKRˇIVAN, “Soumrak rˇíše Cˇchingu˚”, p. 257; for more on Britain’s stance
on the Treaty of Shimonoseki, see F.Q. QUO, “British Diplomacy and the Cession of
Formosa, 1894–95”, in:Modern Asian Studies, 2, 2, 1968, pp. 141–154.
25 TNA, PRO 30/33/16/4, Ernest Mason Satow diary, 8. 10. 1901.
26 J. A. WHITE, The Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War, Princeton 1964, p. 5.
27 TNA, PRO 30/33/16/4, Ernest Mason Satow diary, 14. 12. 1900; MALOZEMOFF, pp.
153–155.
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observers that Russia had basically created its own protectorate in
Manchuria and that it was planning to annex the northern part of
Manchuria, including Harbin.28 Britain’s envoy in Beijing, one of the
absolute leading experts on Far East issues, Sir Ernest Mason Satow,
said of this whole situation that because Russia had managed to con-
vince the imperial court that it was its best friend it had increased its
influence in the Far East significantly.29 The British diplomat consid-
ered Russia’s objective to be the acquisition of a dominant position
in China to the detriment of Great Britain.30 As such, Russian policy
represented a deadly threat to London’s key interests, for which trade
with China was more important than with any other part of the British
Empire. Bringing together political and economic issues in its Far East
policy meant that Britain’s political position and influence in Beijing
was closely associated with its economic interests. These were now at
threat due to increasing pressure from Russia.
As such, British policy endeavoured to force Russia to commit itself
to withdrawing its forces from Manchuria – the territory of a foreign
country – by a certain (specific) time. For a long time, St Petersburg
refused to acquiesce to these demands, and once it had begun nego-
tiations with Beijing on withdrawing its units, its intention was clear
– to avoid a clear commitment in this regard and force China to make
the greatest concessions possible. One such concession, for example,
was the agreement that China would not allow any other country than
Russia mining rights in Manchuria. When the agreement on evacu-
ating Manchuria was finally signed in 8 April 1902, it was merely a
response to the collapse of previous negotiations with China and the
conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.31 By this time, most Chi-
nese, including Li Hongzhang, who had died in November 1901, had
realised that Russia’s previous friendly policy had been solely moti-
vated by its expansive intentions. Although China attempted to gain
the support of the Great Powers (with Britain advising it not to com-
promise),32 during subsequent negotiations it was almost impossible
28 TNA, PRO 30/33/16/4, Ernest Mason Satow diary, 25. 10. 1901; I. NISH, The Origins
of the Russo-Japanese War, London – New York 1985, pp. 91–93.
29 TNA, PRO 30/33/16/4, Ernest Mason Satow diary, 25. 11. 1901.
30 Ibidem.
31 MALOZEMOFF, p. 175.
32 TNA, PRO 30/33/16/5, Ernest Mason Satow diary, 11. 1. 1902.
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to resist Russian pressure. This allowed St Petersburg to force the in-
clusion of a clause in the withdrawal agreement which stated that
withdrawal would only occur if there was no disorder or if it was
not prevented from doing so by the measures of other Great Powers,
something which essentially made the agreement redundant.33
In the mean time, Russia’s position not just in Manchuria, but also
in Korea, was fundamentally boosted. Not just Britain, but also Japan
which perceived Korea as key for its interests and security, were sig-
nificantly disturbed by the activities of the Russian company headed
by Yulii Mikhailovich Briner which acquired the right to mine in the
basin of the Yalu River forming the border between Manchuria and
Korea.34 This measure was then linked to the placement of 2,000 sol-
diers on the Chinese side of the border with Korea.35 Russia had thus
evidently set out on a path to further territorial expansion in the Far
East. Russian Finance Minister Sergei Yulyevich Witte’s opinion cau-
tioning Tsar Nicholas II and promoting economic penetration of the
region was suppressed by a pressure group around the Tsar’s key ad-
visor, Aleksandr Mikhailovich Bezobrazov.36 The success of this reck-
less political adventurer37 can be explained by Tsar Nicholas II’s dwin-
dling willingness to listen to Witte, who had been a key figure in Rus-
sian politics for a whole decade. It was Bezobrazov who managed to
convince the Tsar of the economic benefits of logging in the Yalu river
valley. His influence led Nicholas II and a number of leading members
of the Russian nobility to invest a few million roubles in the business.
As such, Briner’s companywas then also easily able to serve as pretext
for Russia’s military presence in the region.38
Besides Great Britain, it was Japan which felt its interests were most
threatened, considering Korea a potential “dagger pointing at Japan’s
33 WHITE, p. 10.
34 MALOZEMOFF, p. 181.
35 WHITE, p. 44.
36 MALOZEMOFF, p. 177.
37 For more on this figure and the policy of his clique at the imperial court, see I. V.
LUKOIANOV, “The Bezobrazovtsy”, in: J.W. STEINBERG – B.W. MENNING – D.
SCHIMMELPENNINCK VAND DER OYE, The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspec-
tive. World War Zero, Leiden – Boston 2005, pp. 65–86.
38 Y. PARK, Korea and the Imperialists. In Search of a National Identity, Bloomingdon 2009,
p. 60.
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heart”.39 Tokyo’s attempts at reaching an agreement with Russia re-
garding Japanese interests in Korea and forcing it to limit any further
expansion, however, collapsed to a certain extent through Russian in-
transigence. As such, the situation was perceived to be serious. The
imperial government, however, was painfully aware of Japan’s weak-
nesses and isolation. Its recollection of the Triple Intervention further
clearly demonstrated what Japan’s chances would be if it had to face
the power’s pressure alone. As such, Japan’s Prime Minister, Itó Hi-
robumi, and his successor, Katsura Taró (he held the role from 2 June
1901), came to the conclusion that Japan on the one hand would have
to continue in its negotiations with Russia, but at the same time would
have to secure strong support from another Great Power which could
help it resist St Petersburg. Due to France andGermany’s limited inter-
ests in the region and their long-term support of Russian policy, only
Great Britain and the United States seemed possible partners, and they
welcomed Japan’s proclamation regarding support for the Open Door
Policy.40
Of these two options, a connection with Great Britain appeared
most hopeful, a country which had long been a model for Meiji era
statesmen. In this regard, the situation was favourable for Japan. Like
Japan, Britain felt itself in the defence, and it perceived Russia’s pen-
etration as a threat to its vital interests. At the same time, it regarded
themethodwhich St Petersburg exploited its problems in South Africa
very negatively. Also important was the fact that Britain had begun
to realise that if it did not activate its policy and provide Japan with
support, then the island empire would have to come to an agreement
with Russia at any price.41 This, however, would mean Britain remain-
ing essentially isolated in the Far East.42 Britain’s long-term sympathy
towards Japan also played an important role, Britain sharing similar
interests and also being one of the key countries which had helped the
Meiji government in implementing its reforms. As such, voices call-
ing for closer co-operation between the two countries were nothing
new.43 In 1901, London was thus pleased to acknowledge Japan’s pos-
39 NISH, The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War, pp. 97ff.
40 OTTE, The China Question, p. 286.
41 ROSENBAUM, p. 62.
42 OTTE, The China Question, p. 286.
43 Ibidem, p. 71.
251
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
West Bohemian Historical Review VI j 2016 j 2
itive response to its probing on possible collaboration.44 Despite divi-
sions in Japan’s government with some politicians supporting a link
with Britain and a second section of the cabinet proposing compro-
mises with Russia and an agreement with St Petersburg at any price,
in April 1901 the Japanese envoy in London, Count Hayashi Tadasu,
made a proposition to Britain’s Foreign Secretary Lansdowne, “to make
a permanent agreement for the maintenance of peace in the Far East”.45
Due to disputes within Japan’s cabinet regarding the further direc-
tion of foreign policy, further convergence between the two countries
did not occur until October 1901 when Japan’s Foreign Minister, Ko-
mura Jutaró, outlined to British envoy, Sir Claude MacDonald, the op-
portunity for an agreement based on the principles of preserving Ko-
rea’s integrity, an Open Door Policy in China and ensuring that should
one of the parties get into conflict with a third country then no other
power would intervene.46 Japan hoped that Germany would also sign
a similar agreement.47 In the meantime, Britain was anxiously moni-
toring the discussions taking place between Japan and Russia. If they
were to come to a successful conclusion before they themselves could
reach agreement with Tokyo, then Britain would remain isolated in
Asia, something which would have fundamental consequences for
its further interests. As such, Envoy MacDonald informed Japan at
the beginning of November that the British government agreed with
the political framework outlined by Komura.48 Britain, however, re-
mained somewhat cool to the idea of Germany getting involved in the
Anglo-Japanese agreement, as such an agreement would have had a
fundamental impact on Britain’s position in Europe. Although Anglo-
German negotiations had been taking place since 1898 in which both
Germany and Britain were attempting to create closer ties between
the countries, their course had been interrupted by a number of funda-
mental factors. In particular, these included London’s attempt to avoid
overcommitments on the continent, the beginnings of Germany’s arm-
44 TNA, FO 46/563, Whitehead to Salisbury, 14. 8. 1901; cf. NISH, The Anglo-Japanese
Alliance, pp. 143ff.
45 A.M. POLEY (ed.), The Secret Memoirs of Count Tadasu Hayashi, Vol. 2, New York 2002,
p. 121.
46 TNA, FO 46/563, MacDonald to Lansdowne, Tokyo, 24. 10. 1901.
47 Ibidem.
48 TNA, FO 46/563, MacDonald to Lansdowne, Tokyo, 6. 11. 1901.
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ing of the navy and unfortunate statements made by Chancellor
Bülow.49 At the time when Japan was beginning to pursue relations
with Britain, London began to lose interest in agreement with Ger-
many. From their perspective, Japanese support in the Far East was
much more useful than German support. As such, MacDonald in-
formed Komura that Britain preferred negotiations with Japan only
in that their two countries were closer to each other than Britain was
with Germany.50 As such, in the end, Japan had to abandon its idea of
Germany joining the planned Anglo-Japanese Alliance.51
Lansdowne, however, was aware he needed to hurry. The situa-
tion in Tokyo was continuing to deteriorate through Russian pressure.
Marquis Itó was known for preferring an agreement with Russia and
at this time was visiting first Berlin, then in November 1901 also St Pe-
tersburg where Witte assured him that Russia had no special interests
in Korea.52 Although these concurrent Japanese discussions aroused
a certain suspicion in London, they did force Britain to make a final
decision. The danger of isolation should Japan settle its disputes with
Russia was a real one. As such, Britain submitted its proposal for a for-
mal alliance to Hiyashi.53 Katsura’s new government did not discuss
it, however, until the beginning of December. Since its negotiations in
St Petersburg had become deadlocked, it seemed to government mem-
bers that an alliance with Great Britain was the only way out of their
difficult position. An alliance with Britain would strengthen Japan’s
negotiating position towards Russia. Should the disputes between the
two countries grow into military conflict, the support of Britain and its
loans would be key for its successful conduct.54 In Britain, a number
of British politicians wanted more of a loose tie with Japan, but they
were aware that without adequate support it would be difficult for
49 A.W. WRAD – G. P. GOOCH, The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy 1783–
1919, Vol. 3, Cambridge 1923, pp. 276–286.
50 TNA, FO 46/563, MacDonald to Lansdowne, Tokyo, 20. 11. 1901.
51 TNA, FO 46/563, Hayashi to Lansdowne, 19. 12. 1901.
52 KEENE, p. 579.
53 TNA, FO 46/563, Draft treaty between the British and Japanese governments,
November 1901.
54 Britain had provided the first large loan to Japan in 1899, which was one of the mea-
sures which contributed to the rapproachment between the two countries. NISH, The
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, p. 77.
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them to resist Russia alone.55 As such, a shared resistance to Russian
expansion was the catalyst which led Britain not just to abandoning
its policy of “Splendid Isolation”, but also to concluding the first equal
treaty of alliance with a non-European power.
Thus, on 10 December, Komura was able to informMacDonald that
the British proposal had received the support not just of the govern-
ment, but also of the Emperor himself.56 As such, discussions could
move on to the next phase of negotiations over the details of the pre-
pared treaty. One of these points, for example, was Japan’s demand
that Britain maintain a sufficiently strong fleet in the Far East such
that in the event of a wider conflict both countries would have a nu-
merical advantage over Russia, France and Germany.57 Britain, how-
ever, wanted to avoid such a commitment. They were nevertheless
aware that Tokyo in particular worried of a possible French interven-
tion should a war break out with Russia. As such, London was forced
to take a clear position and accede to the Japanese proposal that the
signatories would be required to come to their partner’s aid in the
event of getting into conflict with two other powers.58 Another of Brit-
ain’s concessions was to recognise Tokyo’s entitlement to reserve its
right to act independently against Russia in Korea such that it could
protect its interests.59
As such, the first weeks of January 1902 saw the gradual finalis-
ing of the treaty between the two countries. Although Britain had to
make concessions to Japan in a number of issues,60 it did leave itself
the freedom to act as it saw fit should war take place between Japan
and Russia. This compromise definitively opened up a path to con-
cluding this key treaty for both countries. 30 January 1902, when the
signing of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance took place in London, repre-
sented a real turning point which heralded the end of one era in the
history of international relations. Because of the key position which
55 TNA, PRO 30/33/16/5, Ernest Mason Satow diary, 12. 2. 1902.
56 The final decision followed quite a long debate which was affected by the fact that
Itó wanted to reach an agreement with Russia, and his supporters in the government
perceived negotiations with Britain as breaching the policy of the former Prime Min-
ister at a time when he could not speak out on the issue. KEENE, p. 575.
57 TNA, FO 46/563, MacDonald to Lansdowne, Tokyo, 11. 12. 1901.
58 TNA, FO 46/563, MacDonald to Lansdowne, Tokyo, 19. 12. 1901.
59 TNA, FO 46/563, Lansdowne to MacDonald, London, 7. 1. 1902.
60 TNA, FO 46/563, Lansdowne to MacDonald, London, 22. 1. 1902.
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China still held within British policy and its imperial system, it is no
surprise that it was the Chinese question which led the British cabinet
to reassess its previous political course, one it had held continuously
since the Congress of Vienna with the exception of the Crimean War.
On the other hand, however, the little impact that the treaty had in re-
gard to British interests in Europe has led a number of historians not
to perceive it as the definitive end to Britain’s policy of “Splendid Iso-
lation”, but rather as a matter of regional policy which had an impact
only on the Far East, and not on the direction of Great Britain’s foreign
policy as a whole.61
What was, however, important from a practical perspective was
the fact that although the treaty assured Britain of Japanese support
against a third power (and vice-versa), it did not commit it to direct
engagement should the disputes between Japan and Russia culminate
in war. In this case, Britain would be obliged to maintain benevo-
lent neutrality. Only if another country were to get involved in the
conflict against Japan (which was not very likely) would Britain be
obliged to intervene at the side of the island empire. Articles 1 and
4 of the treaty were also important points. In the first of these, Japan
recognised Britain’s “special” rights and interests in China, and Britain
recognised Japanese interests in Korea. In Article 4, both countries
undertook not to conclude any separate agreement with other pow-
ers which would breach the articles of the treaty of alliance being
concluded.62 As such, not only had Britain managed to prevent any
Japanese capitulation to Russian pressure which would lead to Rus-
sian dominance in northern China, and likely also Korea, but it had
also got Tokyo on its side. Japan was thus to serve as a kind of barrier
against Russian advance, its task being to protect Britain’s interests in
China. On the other hand, Japan had pierced its isolation and acquired
a strong ally whichwould allow it to face up to Russian pressuremuch
more vigorously than it had in recent years.63
61 OTTE, The China Question, p. 325.
62 TNA, FO 46/563, Treaty between the governments of Great Britain and Japan,
London, 30. 1. 1902. The full wording of the treaty can be found at http://www.
firstworldwar.com/source/anglojapanesealliance1902.htm [2016–08–03]; cf. POLEY,
p. 323an.
63 WHITE, p. 94.
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In terms of the international situation in the Far East, the treaty
represented a marked change in the balance of power. Two countries
which until then had been isolated and defensive, joined forces to de-
fend their interests against new arrivals. Although the report on the
agreement from London raised concerns in Russia, Russia’s general
approach to Japan did lead to an underestimation of the country. The
Japanesewere perceived essentially as distant barbarians, and the only
information the public knew about them comprised second-hand re-
alities and stories.64 As such, few realised that the treaty which had
been concluded would be one of the key moments which would help
stop Russian expansion in Asia. The mood in Germany was more one
of disappointment regarding the treaty, because it meant the end of
hopes of co-operation with Britain. German policy subsequently fo-
cused on supporting Russia which through its engagement in Asia
was meant to be kept outside of European affairs.65
The Consequences of the Russo-Japanese War
Complex negotiations took place over the following two years be-
tween Tokyo and St Petersburg whose objective was to stop the Rus-
sian advance in Manchuria. Russia’s intransigence and the further ex-
pansion of its military presence in Manchuria, however, meant that at
the end of 1903 Tokyo came to the conclusion that war was unavoid-
able and if Japan was to have any hope of victory it would have to
attack before Russia fortified its position any further.66 The outcome
was a severance of relations between the two countries67 and the sub-
sequent surprise attack by the Japanese navy on the Russian base in
Port Arthur. The conflict which broke out was to permanently change
the face of Far East politics. While Britain responded at the beginning
of the war as if it was a necessity for Japan to defend its interests in
Korea,68 from the beginning of the war German diplomacy was more
supportive of Russia.69 This fact can be demonstrated in German’s as-
64 LENSEN, p. 464ff.
65 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtiges Amtes, Berlin (further only PA AA), China No.
1, R 17677, Mumm von Schwarzenstein to Bülow, Peking, 31. 5. 1902.
66 NISH, The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War, p. 200.
67 WHITE, p. 128.
68 TNA, FO 46/577, MacDonald to Lansdowne, Tokyo, 6. 2. 1904.
69 PA AA, Japan No. 20, R 18757, Arco Valley to Bülow, Tokyo, 7. 2. 1904.
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sistance in supplying Russia’s 2nd Pacific Fleet heading to battle in
Tsushima and Emperor Wilhelm II’s proposal to conclude an agree-
ment on European affairs shortly before the end of the war.70
Although a recap of the conflict cannot be given at this point, suf-
fice it to say that the Russian advance southwards (to Manchuria and
northern China) was ended for good. Thanks to its victory, Japan, de-
spite its economic weakness, became the first non-Western country to
join the group of world powers. This fact can indisputably be consid-
ered one of the fundamental outcomes of British policy in China, be-
cause there is no doubt that Japan’s victory was dependent on British
support in many regards. This support was seen both in British as-
sistance in quickly building up an extensive Japanese fleet,71 and in
particular generous loans from British bankers, who also became key
“purchasers” of Japanese government bonds which Tokyo used to
fund its war efforts.72 Without this British assistance, Japan would not
have been in the position not just to win the war, but to wage it at all.
London considered these British investments in Japan’s war efforts
to be of great benefit, because besides the economic gains they ensured
that Britain could eliminate its greatest rival in China without hav-
ing to be involved in battle itself. But stopping Russia and supporting
Japan also had its disadvantages: “Japan’s victories over Russia at sea
and in Manchuria had profound implications for Britain and the other Pow-
ers. Within the Far Eastern subsystem of international politics, Satow noted
somewhat uneasily, ‘the rise of Japan has so completely upset our equilib-
rium as a new planet the size of Mars would derange the solar system’; while
Maurice Paléologue, sous-directeur for political affairs at the Quai d’Orsay,
likened Tsushima to the defeat of Philip II’s ‘Invincible Armada’ and ‘a mar-
qué la fin de la domination russe en Asie’.”73 Thus Japan became one of
the key factors in Far Eastern politics with whom the other powers
would from now on have to calculate. Although Britain remained the
70 D. WARNER – P. WARNER, The Tide at Sunrise. A History of the Russo-Japanese War
1904–1905, London – Portland 2002, pp. 403, 528.
71 D.C. EVANS – M.R. PEATTIE, Kaigun. Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial
Japanese Navy 1887–1941, Annapolis 1997, pp. 60–66.
72 E. S. MILLER, “Japan’s Other Victory: Overseas Financing of the Russo-Japanese
War”, in: J.W. STEINBERG – B.W. MENNING – D. SCHIMMELPENNINCK VAND
DER OYE, The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective. World War Zero, Leiden –
Boston 2005, pp. 470ff.
73 OTTE, The China Question, p. 322.
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dominant power in China, from now on it would be to some extent
dependent on Japanese support. As such, London would have to en-
deavour to maintain the best possible relations with Tokyo. Its policy
in China was thus heavily linked in with its stance on Japan. Follow-
ing the Russo-Japanese War, Britain was forced to extend its alliance
with Japan (originally agreed for five years) in order to ensure its po-
sition in China could be maintained.74 Paradoxically, the outcome of
Britain’s attempts to stop Russia, leading to the Russo-Japanese War,
thus transformed Britain’s position in the Far East in a major way. Al-
though it retained its interests in China, the era of its dominance was
over for good despite the fact its principal rival had been fundamen-
tally weakened. This paradoxical situation was a result of the fact that
Britain helped Japan achieve the position of a Great Power, and ac-
cepted it as an equal participant in Chinese policy. Other factors limit-
ing Britain’s position in China were the deteriorating situation in Eu-
rope which averted Britain’s attention from the Chinese issue, and the
strengthening of Germany and the USA’s economic interests in the
Far East. Although to a certain extent London remained arbiter of Far
Easter politics, from now on it would have to accept limitations to its
power which would bring it to make bigger concessions than it had
done previously.
Japan’s growing importance for British policy in the Far East meant
that Britain’s position in China depended on the Russo-Japanese set-
tlement following the end of the Russo-Japanese War, and also on the
earliest possible taking of profits from the conflict and their subse-
quent economic use.75 The Treaty of Portsmouth, which forced Russia
to recognise Japanese interests in Korea, evacuate Manchuria, return
leased territories (Port Arthur and Dalian) to China and give Japan
the southern part of Sakhalin, could not form a long-term basis for fur-
ther relations between both powers. Beyond its effects on Japanese do-
mestic policy where public dissatisfaction with the outcome of peace
negotiations led to the fall of Katsura’s government,76 both countries
had an understandable interest in securing their interests in the re-
74 Ibidem, p. 323.
75 TNA, FO 405/171, General Report on China for the year 1906, pp. 10–11, Jordan to
Grey, Peking, 1. 6. 1907.
76 R. KOWNER, “The war as a Turning Point in Modern Japanese History”, in: R.
KOWNER (ed.), The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War, New York 2007, pp. 39–41.
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gion through mutual discussions. The British government supported
this attempt to a certain extent, because it hoped that a contractual
confirmation of the outcome of the Portsmouth peace treaty would
lead to a definitive calming of the situation in Asia at a time when it
had to concentrate its attention on Europe. This meant that during its
negotiations with Russia, Tokyo could assume London’s support. In
exchange for this favourable approach, Japan accommodated Britain
in regard to customs collection in Manchuria, as this issue fell within
the competence of the Imperial Maritime Custom Service which was
formally controlled by the Chinese government, but which was in fact
controlled by Britain, represented by the Custom Service’s Inspector-
General, Sir Robert Hart.77
Thus at the end of July 1907, an agreement was signed in which
St Petersburg finally recognised Japan’s special interests in Korea and
southern Manchuria, while Japan did the same for Russia’s status in
northern Manchuria (where a major section of the Trans-Siberian Rail-
way led) and in Outer Mongolia.78 This agreement was meant to en-
sure that both countries would respect each other’s territorial integrity
and China’s independence, although this did not really dissipate the
suspicions of Beijing, whichwas observing at the same time how Japan
was limiting the independence of Korea despite its prior guarantees.79
This agreement was the first step towards a cautious co-operation be-
tween the two former enemies. Since Japan had also concluded an
agreement recognising its interests with the French at the same time,
its policy in China was perceived with marked suspicion. Beijing was
afraid that this activity might be a precursor to the creation of a bloc
of powers which would act as one and which would prevent it from
exploiting disputes between powers to defend its own special inter-
ests. It was China’s experience that it was much less dangerous to deal
with one power than a combination of powers.80 This could explain
the rise in the popularity of Germany which it appeared found itself
77 TNA, FO 405/175, Agreement on establishing an office for the collection of maritime
customer in the Far East, Peking, 30. 5. 1907.
78 M.MATSUI, “The Russo-Japanese Agreement of 1907: The Causese and the Progress
of Negotiations”, in:Modern Asian Studies, 6, 1, 1972, p. 33.
79 TNA, FO 881/9229, General Report on China for the year 1907, p. 20, Jordan to Grey,
Peking, 18. 4. 1908.
80 TNA, FO 405/175, Jordan to Grey, Peking, 21. 8. 1907.
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isolated in China. But because it was the only power (with the excep-
tion of the USA) not contractually bound to any other power, it kept
open the opportunity for independent action in the eyes of China.81
German representatives in the Far East were well aware of this fact.
Germany’s ambassador in Japan, Alfons Mumm von Schwarzenstein,
was at this time endeavouring to correct the damage which Germany
had inflicted in the eyes of China through its actions during the Boxer
Rebellion. On the other hand, however, it was bitterly aware that the
agreement with Russia and France involved Japan in the nascent
Agreement and markedly increased its status in the Middle King-
dom.82
The deepening of this trend could be seen two years later when
America’s attempt to implement the Open Door Policy in Manchuria
and neutralise the Manchurian railway (which the British envoy had
termed shameless),83 forced Tokyo and St Petersburg to debate on re-
stricting American influence and securing their spheres of interest. In
July 1910, a new convention was signed which confirmed most of the
points in the previous agreement and bound both countries to main-
tain the status quo in Manchuria. This agreement, which was some-
what worrying from a British policy perspective, in contrast to the
agreement of 1907 did not contain a clause stating that both pow-
ers recognised China’s territorial integrity.84 It was mainly China and
America, however, which criticised this fact.85 On the other hand,
however, Britain recognised the interests of both countries in their
81 Ibidem.
82 PAAA, China No. 1, R 17693, Mummvon Schwarzenstein to Tschirschky, Tokyo, 5. 8.
1907; for more on the impact of the Russo-Japanese War and subsequent developing
in German politics, see M. S. SELIGMANN, “Germany, the Russo-Japanese War, and
the Road to the Great War”, in: R. KOWNER (ed.), The Impact of the Russo-Japanese
War, New York 2007, pp. 109–123. The author here develops a theory that it was
contempt for the performance of the Russian army that led the head of Prussia’s
General Staff, Alfred von Schlieffen to rework Germany’s war plans. Ibidem, p. 120.
83 TNA, FO 881/9867, General Report on China for the year 1910, pp. 37ff, Jordan to
Grey, Peking, 5. 3. 1911; for American policy on the railway in Manchuria, see also
TNA, FO 46/200, Bryce to Müller, 24. 7. 1910.
84 TNA, FO 405/200, statement of the Chinese government on the Russo-Japanese
Agreement, Peking, 21. 7. 1910; P. BERTON, “From Enemies to Allies: The War and
Russo-Japanese Relations”, in: R. KOWNER (ed.), The Impact of the Russo-Japanese
War, New York 2007, p. 80.
85 TNA, FO 405/200, Müller to Grey, Peking, 27. 7. 1910.
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spheres of influence and was more welcoming of the agreement as it
fell within their long-term policy of maintaining an alliancewith Japan
and an entente with Russia, a policy whose objective was to maintain
Germany’s isolation even in the Far East, as Germany appeared to be
an ever greater rival to British power.86 The Germans were undoubt-
edly well aware of this fact. As such, German policy endeavoured to
support American demands in Manchuria87 and the Open Door Pol-
icy.88 Berlin justifiably feared that conclusion of the agreement would
allow Russia to pursue an active policy in the West.89 Germany’s at-
tempt to keep Russia occupied in the Far East (which was entirely
obvious before 1904) thus definitively collapsed at this moment. The
impacts of the Russo-Japanese agreement on practical policy in the
Far East, however, were almost immediate. It allowed Japan to declare
its annexation of Korea. Russia them supported the establishment of
an independent Mongolia90 and in the next agreement with Japan di-
vided up spheres of influence with it in Outer Mongolia. British pol-
icy’s benign attitude meant that the United States remained alone in
their attempt to force the other powers to maintain the Open Door
Policy, and over the course of five years, a large part of East Asia was
divided up between Russia and Japan.91
In no way, however, did conclusion of the Russo-Japanese agree-
ment mean that all memories of the Russo-Japanese War had been
buried for good. In Russia (and also in London), the agreement was
perceived as quite unequivocally beneficial for Japan, allowing it to
boost its influence in Manchuria and China. St Petersburg feared that
Japan’s next objective would be to acquire a dominant status in Man-
churia, which would weaken its maritime defence significantly Rus-
sia considered that the principal objective of any Japanese aggression
would be Vladivostok. This is one reason why the presence of the
86 A large section of the Chinese press saw the agreement in a similar way. TNA, FO
405/200, Appendix to the report of 27 July 1910, Peking, 27. 7. 1910.
87 J. LEPSIUS – A. MENDELSSOHN BARTHOLDY – F. THIMME (eds.), Die Grosse
Politik der Europäischen Kabinette (further only GP), Berlin 1926, von Treutler to
Bethmann-Hollweg, Bergen, 13. 7. 1910, p. 123.
88 Ibidem, Bethmann-Hollweg to Emperor Wilhelm II, Hohenfinow, 16. 7. 1910, p. 125.
89 Ibidem, Pourtalès to Bethmann-Hollweg, St Petersburg, 19. 7. 1910, pp. 126–127.
90 TNA, FO 881/10072, General Report on China for the year 1911, p. 31, Jordan to Grey,
Peking, 27. 3. 1912.
91 BERTON, p. 81.
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Russian armed forces in the area was again boosted around 1910. As
such, Russian garrisons were heavily fortified.92 On the other hand,
however, the actual situation forced St Petersburg to co-operate with
Tokyo. As early as 1911, the two governments collaborated in block-
ing the American proposal for a loan to China, and their single voice
was clear to see after the Chinese Revolution broke out when mutual
support allowed both countries to strengthen their position in their
spheres of interest.93
This rise of Japan led to London paying great attention to its pen-
etration of the Asian continent. Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese
War secured it a major sphere of influence in northern China, from
whose hands it had definitively torn away any kind of influence in Ko-
rean affairs. It was likely for this reason that relations between Tokyo
and Beijing were palpably tense, particularly when Beijing was forced
to essentially watch powerless as Japan pursued its demands in Man-
churia, which it was guaranteed in the agreement of both countries
of December 1905.94 The prevailing opinion in China’s imperial court
was that Japan was exploiting China’s weak position and trying to ac-
quire as many gains as possible on the continent before it reformed
into a modern state.95 China also resented the growing influence of
its Asian neighbour in Manchuria, which furthermore had taken a
certain paternalistic stance on Beijing when Japan’s Foreign Minister,
Count Hayashi, advised China to avoid Korea’s fate and rather, “to
take a warning from Corea and set her house into order”.96 Such statements
from the Japanese minister, however, merely added fuel to the fire, as
at this period there were disputes between the two countries over the
railway in southern Manchuria, which was also fed by the scandal re-
garding Japan’s TatsuMaru boat whichwas seized by Chinese officials
in Canton in February 1908 for allegedly smuggling weapons.97 This
92 Just during 1910, the eighty-thousand strong Vladivostok garrison was enlarged by
50 %. TNA, FO 881/9867, General Report on China for the year 1910, p. 43, Jordan to
Grey, Peking, 5. 3. 1911.
93 BERTON, p. 81.
94 TNA, FO 881/9229, General Report on China for the year 1907, pp. 17–18, Jordan to
Grey, Peking, 18. 4. 1908.
95 PA AA, China No. 1, R 17694, Rex to the Foreign Office, Peking, 31. 10. 1907.
96 TNA, FO 881/9466, General Report on China for the year 1908, p. 17, Jordan to Grey,
Peking, 26. 3. 1909.
97 TNA, FO 405/182, Grey to Jordan, London, 22. 2. 1908.
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resulted in a forceful Japanese protest, which then caused a retaliatory
boycott of Japanese goods in southern Chinese towns.98 Thus, the first
half of 1908 was marked by ever deteriorating Sino-Japanese relations
which didn’t even improve after Hayashi was removed from his min-
isterial role and his successors, Terauchi Masatake and Komura Jutaró
endeavoured to improve China’s relations with Japan.
Britain’s envoy in Beijing, Sir John Jordan, however, only noted
drily of this attempt: “but in spite of these demonstrations of friendliness
Japan has still the misfortune to be regarded with suspicion by China, and it is
a strange irony of fate that the only nation in the Far East which succeeded in
working out its own salvation on modern lines should win the admiration of
Western Powers and fail to gain the confidence and respect of its neighbours
in the East”.99 Not even 1909 was to bring more fundamental change.
Japan and China got into protracted disputes over Japan’s entitlement
to concessions which Tokyo was meant to receive on the basis of the
Peace Treaty of Portsmouth which ended the Russo-Japanese War.100
Although these disputes were solved at the end of 1909 by a Sino-
Japanese agreement, Beijing’s distrust of Tokyo’s intentions had in no
way disappeared.101
In contrast to the strengthening Japan, Russia was markedly weak-
ened by its defeat in the war with the island empire, and its influence
in China was significantly reduced. As such, it had to pursue a fairly
conciliatory policy towards Beijing in an endeavour to protect what
was left of its interests in northern China. As such, the St Petersburg
government determined to take a step which it had long avoided be-
fore the war – to withdraw its military forces from Manchuria (which
was logical under the chaos which had broken out in Russia as a result
of the revolution). This compromise was received positively in China,
and created space for the Russians to undertake successful negotia-
tions on the mining concessions which its citizens had received pre-
98 In the end, the dispute was resolved through British mediation. TNA, FO 405/182,
Jordan to Grey, Peking, 17. 3. 1908.
99 TNA, FO 881/9466, General Report on China for the year 1908, p. 17, Jordan to Grey,
Peking, 6. 3. 1909.
100 TNA, FO 881/9657, General Report on China for the year 1909, pp. 20–26, Jordan to
Grey, Peking, 30. 1. 1910.
101 TNA, FO 881/9867, General Report on China for the year 1910, p. 37, Jordan to Grey,
Peking, 5. 3. 1911.
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viously.102 Subsequent to 1907, when Russia concluded its convention
with Japan assuring the status quo in the Far East, St Petersburg’s in-
fluence was essentially limited to northern Manchuria and Mongolia,
where neither Great Britain nor its subjects, as Jordan noted, had any
major interests.103 As such, Britain essentially decided not to interfere
in disputes between Russia and China over concessions in Russia’s
sphere of interests, andwas basically satisfiedwith the palpable weak-
ening of Russia’s position in the Far East, which was demonstrated,
for example, in the fact that in its endeavours to implement its railway
concession in northern Manchuria, St Petersburg had had to rely on
support from Tokyo.104 At least to begin with, however, Japan came
into conflict over Russian railway projects, as it feared they might
serve as a front for future Russian expansion, as had happened before
the Russo-Japanese War.105 However, since it was mainly British com-
panies which were to be involved in railway construction in northern
China, supplying the necessary know-how and funding, Japanese re-
sistance met with protest. On the other hand, it should be noted that
Britain tried to accommodate Tokyo to preserve good relations, and
blocked a number of Russian proposals.106 As such, subsequent to
1905 Russia did not present a major threat for Britain in China, and
this can be demonstrated in the fact that the volume of Russian trade
with China came to just under half a percent of British trading with
the Middle Kingdom (including British colonies and other dependent
territories).107
In this regard, one can state in conclusion that British policy proved
an unqualified success in regard to its rivalry with Russia. Britain had
managed to force its rival out of a large part of China, and ward off
102 TNA, FO 405/171, General Report on China for the year 1906, p. 11, Jordan to Grey,
Peking, 1. 6. 1907.
103 TNA, FO 881/9466, General Report on China for the year 1908, p. 21, Jordan to Grey,
Peking, 26. 3. 1909.
104 TNA, FO 881/9657, General Report on China for the year 1909, p. 29, Jordan to Grey,
Peking, 30. 1. 1910.
105 TNA, FO 371/410, Memorandum on the Japanese Government’s Protest against
Construction of the Northern Railways, Peking, 8. 1. 1908.
106 TNA, FO 371/410, Memorandum of the Pauling Company Limited, Peking, 4. 2.
1908.
107 TNA, FO 405/171, General Report on China for the year 1906, p. 21, Jordan to Grey,
Peking, 1. 6. 1907.
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Russia’s threat to its interests. On the other hand, however, from a
long-term perspective this success was somewhat of a Pyrrhic victory,
as a strengthened Japan was to become a significant rival to British
interests in China. The requirement to rely on the support of the island
empire meant for London that it often had to accept Japanese gains
on the continent despite the fact the affected its special interests. The
weakening of Britain’s position at a global level as a result of the First
World War, however, could not be anticipated at the time these events
unfolded. As such, it can be stated that British diplomats’ adept policy
managed to effectively secure Britain’s prominent position in the Far
East prior to 1914.
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